Dr. Martin Mackinnon
Author · Trusted Hardware Economist

> Dr. Martin Mackinnon is based at a university in Toronto, where he works on the quantitative analysis of trusted hardware. His training was in economics, and he still approaches the subject as an analyst of flows: of capital into fabs, of wafers through shuttles, of vulnerabilities through disclosure and patch cycles, and of trust from a silicon vendor to the person who finally relies on an attestation result.
> His method rests on datasets assembled from public sources. For the confidential-computing chapters he built a time series of published attacks against trusted execution environments, recording for each the affected generation, the disclosure date, the mitigation route (microcode, firmware, compiler change, architectural redesign) and how long the fix took to reach deployed systems. The series shows something narrative histories often miss: that the TEE generations were shaped as much by the attacks they answered as by the features they announced.
> For the fabrication chapters he compiled the published prices and schedules of multi-project wafer shuttles, academic and open, over two decades. The data show how the cost of a first tapeout fell from a sum only a funded research group could find to one that a small team or a determined individual could manage on a mature open PDK, and how lead times, not price, became the binding constraint. He pairs that with the economics of chiplets, where the UCIe specification of 2022 opened the possibility of mixing dies from different fabs, nodes and even countries in one package.
> He is the author of the chapter on regional fabs and the chips acts, which treats the US CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 and the European Chips Act, in force from September 2023, as moments in a longer history of states trying to keep manufacturing capability within reach. He is careful with figures and prefers to cite announced programmes and their stated aims rather than to guess at outcomes still unfolding.
> His current work links the two strands. If edge devices are to settle small transactions with one another, each exposure kept small and each payment anchored to measured physical work, then the trustworthiness of the silicon becomes an economic input like any other. He models how the cost of attestation, the lifetime of a root of trust and the frequency of firmware revocation change the price of trust between machines, and he writes about it with the patience of someone used to reading benchmark results that do not quite reconcile.
> Works in English; his datasets carry their source field names unchanged so that other researchers can trace every number back to its document.
- ·UCIe specifications and packaging roadmaps
- ·Text of the European Chips Act and the US CHIPS and Science Act
- ·Security advisories and microcode release notes by vendor
- ·Economic studies of the semiconductor industry
- ·Policy workshops in Brussels
- ·Packaging and test facilities in East Asia and Europe
- ·Edge-computing field deployments in northern Ontario