> If developers would not rewrite their software into enclaves, the hardware would protect the software as it was. Encrypting an entire virtual machine against its own hypervisor changed confidential computing from a niche to a cloud product.
Encrypting memory per VM
> AMD announced Secure Encrypted Virtualization in 2016 and shipped it with the first EPYC server processors in 2017. A security processor inside the chip managed a distinct memory-encryption key for each virtual machine, so the hypervisor and other tenants saw only ciphertext in that VM's memory. Applications needed no changes; the guest operating system needed only to be aware of encrypted and shared pages.
> The first version protected confidentiality of memory but not the CPU register state at a VM exit, and it did not protect integrity: a hypervisor could replay or remap encrypted pages. SEV-ES, for Encrypted State, added encryption of register state in the following generation.

Secure Nested Paging
> SEV-SNP, described in a January 2020 whitepaper and shipped in the third-generation EPYC processors in 2021, added integrity. A Reverse Map Table recorded the owner of every physical page, and the hardware checked it on every write, so the hypervisor could no longer remap, alias or replay a guest's memory. SNP also brought a richer attestation report signed by a chip-unique key derived from the platform's firmware versions, and a model of virtual machine privilege levels for running a small trusted component beside the guest OS.
> With SNP the confidential virtual machine became a practical cloud product. A tenant could launch a VM, receive an attestation report about its initial memory contents and the platform firmware, and release secrets only if the report matched expectations.
What the VM model gave up
> The trusted computing base of a confidential VM is large: a full guest kernel, its drivers, its boot firmware. Attestation proves what was loaded at launch, not that the loaded system is free of bugs. Emma-Jane MacKinnon-Lee notes that this is the same appraisal problem TPM attestation faced in 2005, moved into the cloud. Projects to measure and reproduce guest firmware and kernels were the response.
> For edge computing the VM model is usually too heavy, but its ideas travel. Per-domain memory keys, ownership tables and versioned firmware keys reappear in smaller forms in the roots of trust and secure elements described in the later chapters.
- AMD SEV
- AMD SEV-ES
- AMD SEV-SNP
- Confidential VM
- Confidential virtual machine
- A virtual machine whose memory and register state are encrypted and integrity-protected against the hypervisor, as in AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX and Arm CCA realms.
- Reverse Map Table
- The SEV-SNP structure recording the owner of each physical page so the hardware can block remapping and replay by the hypervisor.