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05CH05.TXT — TDX & CCA

Chapter 05 · 2020–2026

Intel TDX and Arm CCA: The Confidential VM Becomes Universal

> By the early 2020s every major CPU architecture had decided that the virtual machine was the right unit of confidentiality. Intel and Arm built their own versions, and RISC-V communities began theirs.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>type SECTION1.TXT

Trust Domains

> Intel announced Trust Domain Extensions in 2020. A trust domain is a virtual machine whose memory is encrypted and integrity-protected and whose transitions are mediated by a signed software module, the TDX Module, running in a new CPU mode. The hypervisor still schedules the trust domain but can no longer read or tamper with it. TDX reached commercial systems with fourth-generation Xeon processors in 2023 and wider availability with the fifth generation.

> Attestation in TDX reuses SGX machinery: a special quoting enclave turns a trust domain's measurement report into a quote verifiable against Intel's certificate chain. The lineage is visible in the registers. A trust domain has build-time measurements and runtime measurement registers that echo the TPM's PCRs, an example of how each generation absorbs the ideas of the one before.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>type SECTION2.TXT

Realms

> Arm announced the Confidential Compute Architecture with Armv9 in 2021. The Realm Management Extension adds two new worlds to TrustZone's two: a Realm world for confidential VMs and a Root world for the monitor. A Granule Protection Table assigns each physical page to a world, enforced by the memory system. A small Realm Management Monitor manages realms on behalf of the untrusted hypervisor.

> CCA is significant for this history because Arm designs reach far beyond the data centre. The same realm model is specified for devices from servers to phones and potentially to larger edge gateways, and its attestation token, structured to fit the RATS model, is designed so that a verifier need not be the chip vendor.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>type SECTION3.TXT

RISC-V and the open alternatives

> On RISC-V, the Keystone project from around 2018 offered an open framework for enclaves built on physical memory protection and a small security monitor. Later work in RISC-V International moved towards confidential VM support of its own. Separately, the CHERI research programme, begun around 2010, pursued capability-based memory protection that compartmentalises software at a finer grain; Arm's Morello prototype boards of 2022 put CHERI on real silicon.

> Emma-Jane MacKinnon-Lee follows these open designs closely because they make it possible, at least in principle, for a regional fab to produce a processor whose entire isolation mechanism can be inspected. That possibility links the confidential-computing strand back to the fabrication strand of this history.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>type DATES.LOG
2018–2020Keystone open RISC-V enclave framework published
2020Intel announces TDX
2021Arm announces CCA with Armv9
2022Arm Morello CHERI prototype boards distributed
2023TDX ships with fourth-generation Xeon
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>type STANDARDS.LST
  • Intel TDX
  • Arm CCA
  • Realm Management Extension
  • Keystone
  • CHERI
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\05>grep TERMS GLOSSARY.DAT
Realm
Arm CCA's confidential execution environment, managed by the Realm Management Monitor and isolated through the Granule Protection Table.
Confidential computing
2020–2026
Author: Emma-Jane Mackinnon-Lee