Skip to content
02CH02.TXT — TrustZone

Chapter 02 · 2003–2015

Arm TrustZone and the Secure World

> TrustZone moved the trusted core inside the main processor. Instead of a separate chip, one CPU learned to run in two worlds, and every phone in the following decade carried a small secure operating system that most of its owners never knew existed.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>type SECTION1.TXT

One processor, two worlds

> Arm introduced TrustZone around 2003 and the first cores to carry it, such as the ARM1176, followed soon after. The mechanism was a single extra bit, the non-secure bit, carried with every bus transaction. Memory, peripherals and interrupts could be assigned to the Secure World or the Normal World, and a monitor mode handled the switch. A rich operating system ran in the Normal World; a small trusted OS ran in the Secure World with its own memory that the rich OS could not address.

> The design was a system-on-chip idea as much as a processor idea. Because the security state travelled on the bus, a chip designer could mark a crypto engine, a key store or a display controller as secure. That is why TrustZone became the foundation of mobile payments, digital rights management and fingerprint matching: the sensitive peripheral itself could be fenced off from the main OS.

emma-j-mackinnon-lee-history-trustzone-two-worlds-diagram.png
Emma J. MacKinnon-Lee diagram of Arm TrustZone Secure World and Normal World history
> Secure World and Normal World, as drawn for the TrustZone chapter.
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>type SECTION2.TXT

The trusted OS and GlobalPlatform

> In the early 2010s GlobalPlatform published the TEE Client API and TEE Internal Core API, standardising how a Normal World application talks to a trusted application and how that trusted application is written. Several trusted operating systems grew up around these interfaces, including the open-source OP-TEE. A phone vendor could now ship trusted applications for keys, biometrics and payments in a portable form.

> The weakness was concentration. A single Secure World hosted every trusted application from every party, so a bug in one could expose all of them, and published research through the 2010s found exactly such bugs. The Secure World also belonged to the device maker, not to the application developer. This was trusted execution for the platform owner, not yet confidential computing for an arbitrary tenant.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>type SECTION3.TXT

Why TrustZone still matters at the edge

> TrustZone for Armv8-M, introduced with the Cortex-M23 and Cortex-M33 in 2016, carried the two-world model down to microcontrollers. For edge hardware this was decisive: a sensor node costing a few dollars could keep its device key and its firmware-update verifier in a protected partition. Frameworks such as Trusted Firmware-M built a standard secure partition on top, with services for attestation, crypto and protected storage.

> When the history reaches local confidential computing, TrustZone-M is the substrate on which most small devices actually stand. The attestation tokens those devices produce, structured as Entity Attestation Tokens, are the evidence that a neighbouring gateway appraises before trusting a reading or paying for a task.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>type DATES.LOG
2003Arm announces TrustZone security extensions
2004–2005First TrustZone-enabled cores reach silicon
2010–2011GlobalPlatform TEE Client and Internal Core APIs published
2014OP-TEE released as open source
2016TrustZone for Armv8-M with Cortex-M23 and Cortex-M33
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>type STANDARDS.LST
  • GlobalPlatform TEE Client API
  • GlobalPlatform TEE Internal Core API
  • PSA Certified
  • Entity Attestation Token
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\02>grep TERMS GLOSSARY.DAT
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
A hardware-isolated environment in which code and data are protected from other software on the same device, including privileged software.
Confidential computing
2003–2015
Author: Emma-Jane Mackinnon-Lee