> Before there were enclaves there were boxes: separate, armoured processors that held keys and ran a little code where the main computer could not reach. The idea of a small, trustworthy component that vouches for a larger, untrustworthy one begins here.
The armoured box
> In the 1990s the strongest form of trusted computing was physical. Secure coprocessors such as the IBM 4758, a PCI card certified in 1998 at the top level of the FIPS 140-1 standard, wrapped a processor, memory and cryptographic engine in a tamper-responding enclosure that erased its secrets if drilled, cooled or opened. Banks and certificate authorities used them to protect keys from the very servers they were plugged into. The design established a pattern that every later generation would reinterpret: a small trusted core, a clear boundary, and a way for the core to report on its own state.
> That last element, the report, is where attestation begins. A coprocessor could sign a statement about which code it was running, using a key that never left its boundary. A remote party who trusted the manufacturer's certificate could then decide whether to send it secrets. The economics, however, were prohibitive for ordinary machines. A card costing thousands of dollars could not be fitted to every PC, and the question for the next decade was how much of the armoured box could be shrunk into a single cheap chip on every motherboard.

From TCPA to TPM 1.2
> The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance formed in 1999 and published the first Trusted Platform Module specification; its successor, the Trusted Computing Group, took over in 2003. The TPM was deliberately modest. It was not a general-purpose secure processor but a passive chip on a slow bus, holding an endorsement key, a storage root key and a bank of Platform Configuration Registers. Each stage of boot measured the next by hashing it and extending a PCR, so the final register values summarised the whole boot chain. A quote, signed by an attestation identity key, reported those values to a remote verifier.
> TPM 1.2 became common in business laptops in the second half of the 2000s, where it mainly protected disk-encryption keys. Remote attestation was technically possible but rarely deployed. The PCR values of a real PC changed with every driver and firmware update, and few organisations could maintain the lists of known-good measurements that a verifier needs. The lesson, which the RATS architecture would formalise twenty years later, was that producing evidence is the easy part; appraising it against reference values is where systems succeed or fail.
TPM 2.0 and algorithm agility
> The TPM 2.0 Library specification, published by the Trusted Computing Group in 2014 and adopted as ISO/IEC 11889 in 2015, rebuilt the module around algorithm agility. TPM 1.2 was bound to SHA-1 and RSA-2048; TPM 2.0 allowed multiple hash banks, elliptic-curve keys and a richer policy language in which use of a key could be conditioned on PCR state, time, physical presence or a signed authorisation. Firmware TPMs implemented inside other trusted environments, and discrete TPMs on a separate chip, both became normal, and operating systems began to require one.
> For local confidential computing the TPM matters for a reason often overlooked: it was the first widely deployed root of trust that could attest without any network at all. A quote can be checked by any device holding the right certificates and reference values. Emma-Jane MacKinnon-Lee's offline bench work begins from this property, because a TPM quote verified by a neighbouring machine is the oldest form of machine-to-machine attestation still in daily use.
- FIPS 140-1 / 140-2
- TCG TPM 1.2
- TCG TPM 2.0 Library
- ISO/IEC 11889
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
- A standardised security chip or firmware component holding keys and Platform Configuration Registers for measured boot, sealing and attestation; current version TPM 2.0.
- Platform Configuration Register (PCR)
- A TPM register that can only be extended by hashing in a new value, so its final value summarises a sequence of measurements.