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06CH06.TXT — Attestation

Chapter 06 · 2017–2026

Attestation Standards: RATS, DICE, OpenTitan and Caliptra

> Every TEE invented its own evidence format. The standards work of the late 2010s and early 2020s gave them a common vocabulary, and open-source roots of trust gave them a common foundation that anyone could audit.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>type SECTION1.TXT

A shared vocabulary

> The IETF Remote ATtestation procedureS working group was formed in 2018, and its architecture was published as RFC 9334 in January 2023. It names the roles: an Attester produces Evidence; a Verifier appraises Evidence against Endorsements and Reference Values under an Appraisal Policy and produces Attestation Results; a Relying Party acts on those results. It describes two topologies, the passport model where the Attester carries results to the Relying Party, and the background-check model where the Relying Party consults the Verifier.

> The value of RFC 9334 for a comparative study is that it lets every earlier system be described in one language. A TPM quote, an SGX quote, an SNP report and a CCA token are all Evidence; the vendor services are Verifiers; the reference measurement lists are Reference Values. Emma-Jane MacKinnon-Lee uses that mapping as the spine of this history's comparative tables.

emma-jane-mackinnon-lee-history-rats-roles-whiteboard.png
Emma-Jane MacKinnon-Lee whiteboard of RFC 9334 RATS roles Attester Verifier Relying Party
> Attester, Verifier, Relying Party: the RATS roles mapped onto every earlier system.
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>type SECTION2.TXT

DICE: identity for small things

> The Trusted Computing Group's Device Identifier Composition Engine specifications, developed from around 2017, addressed devices too small for a TPM. At power-on, immutable hardware combines a Unique Device Secret with a measurement of the first mutable code to derive a Compound Device Identifier. Each layer derives the next layer's identity in turn and can issue it a certificate. If any layer's code changes, every identity above it changes, so the identity itself is the attestation.

> DICE is the most important idea in this history for edge devices. It needs almost no silicon, works without a network and makes firmware integrity visible to any peer holding the device's certificate chain.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>type SECTION3.TXT

Open silicon roots of trust

> OpenTitan, announced in 2019 as an open-source silicon root of trust project, published its RTL, verification environment and documentation, with first commercial silicon announced in 2024. Caliptra, announced in 2022 under the Open Compute Project, specified an open root of trust intended to be integrated into data-centre system-on-chip designs, with its RTL published openly.

> These projects changed what a root of trust could mean. Instead of a vendor's black box whose behaviour is inferred from documentation, the trusted core could be reviewed, simulated and, in principle, fabricated by a different foundry. For the regional fabs of the later chapters this is the path by which locally made silicon could anchor attestation without importing anyone's secrets.

C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>type DATES.LOG
2017–2018TCG DICE specifications developed
2018IETF RATS working group formed
2019OpenTitan project announced; Confidential Computing Consortium founded
2022Caliptra announced
2023RFC 9334 RATS Architecture published
2024First commercial OpenTitan silicon announced
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>type STANDARDS.LST
  • RFC 9334
  • TCG DICE
  • Entity Attestation Token
  • OpenTitan
  • Caliptra
C:\HISTORY\CHAPTERS\06>grep TERMS GLOSSARY.DAT
Attestation
A process in which one system produces signed evidence about its own state, such as the code it booted, so that another system can decide whether to trust it.
Attester
In RFC 9334, the role that produces Evidence about itself for appraisal by a Verifier.
Verifier
In RFC 9334, the role that appraises Evidence against Endorsements and Reference Values and produces Attestation Results.
Relying Party
In RFC 9334, the role that uses Attestation Results to decide whether to trust an Attester.
DICE
Device Identifier Composition Engine: a TCG approach in which each boot layer derives the next layer's identity from a secret and a measurement, making identity itself an attestation.
Root of trust
The minimal hardware and firmware that must be trusted unconditionally because nothing beneath it can verify it; examples include OpenTitan and Caliptra.
Confidential computing
2017–2026
Author: Emma-Jane Mackinnon-Lee